The Leakage-Resilience Dilemma | |
---|---|
Author | |
Abstract |
Many control-flow-hijacking attacks rely on information leakage to disclose the location of gadgets. To address this, several leakage-resilient defenses, have been proposed that fundamentally limit the power of information leakage. Examples of such defenses include address-space re-randomization, destructive code reads, and execute-only code memory. Underlying all of these defenses is some form of code randomization.
|
Year of Publication |
2019
|
Conference Name |
24th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security
|
Date Published |
09/2019
|
Publisher |
Springer-Verlag
|
Conference Location |
Berlin, Heidelberg
|
ISBN Number |
978-3-030-29958-3
|
URL |
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29959-0_5
|
DOI |
10.1007/978-3-030-29959-0_5
|
Google Scholar | BibTeX | XML | DOI |